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simplyprovidesanalysisgiventhe preferencesof pohcy decision-makers.Sincedecision-makers
rarely reveal their preferences,it is importantthat the would-bepolicyrcsearchhmalystknow the
politicaleconomyand be wiI]ingto identifypotentialperforn-mnce goals for society.Researchers
who are willingto incur the transactioncost associatedwith becominginvolvedin usefid policy
researchmustlearnto workwithintheimperfectpolicyprocess. Policyresearchthatconsidersthe
importanceof implementationand thatacknowledgesthe institutionsand thehistorywill havethe
highestchanceof beingusefulto policy-makers.
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A few years ago I remember someone
saying “Good research leads to good policy”. Those
words continue to haunt mc, I have wanted to
beheve that they were true. Yet, I have been
exposed to enough real experience to know that the
statement should be reworked -- “CJood research
may lead to good policy” or “Bad research may
lead to bad policy”. It is equally likely that “Good
or bad research may have no bearing on a policy.”
The policy process is imperfect. Misunderstandings,
unforseen conflicts of interest, institutiondi failures,
etc., may convert a seemingly desirable and feasible
policy into one which is unacceptable to many
parties, politically unfeasible or mcffectlve. Despite
these realities, I continue to believe that good
research can be important in the imperfect pohcy
process,
I have been asked to reflect on just these
types of questions, A basic thesis of this paper is
that more agricultural economists should strive to
make their work more relevant to the imperfect
policy process. In order to do this, we must see the
process as it is, not as we mrght wish it to be.
Since 1 was an undergraduate working for a US.
Congressman, I have been a student of the policy
process. In 1989, I spent time in Washington as
Research Director for the Congressional
Commission to improve the crop insurance program
and as a visiting scholar at the Economic Research
Service, These experiences added to my education.
In addition, I have been heavily involved in the
development of a new crop insurance program in
the past four years, I trust that these experiences
and my research program have provided me with
some useful insights to share with my professional
colleagues (In addition, sce Skees [1992]).
Through the years, I have learned that
simply performing research and getting it published
in our professional journals is not enough if we
want our work to contribute to improvements in
policy, The effective policy researcher must be
willing to promote general understanding of the
value of his(her) research. He or she must get to
know policy-makers who are strategic to Improved
pohcy and he/she must learn to communicate and
interpret complex research to the layperson. We
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must learn to cope with politics, Research by
agricultural economists n lw~ngused m the policy
process, However, it is likely that more of our
work would be used if more agricultural economists
were wdlmg to incur the transaction costs associated
with becommg more plugged into the pohcy process
and f more economist paid more attention to the
importance of implementation.
A major objective of this paper IS to
motivate others to become tnore involved in
promoting their research-analysis in a mtinncr that
contributes to the policy process. In order to
accomplish that tmk I will share some of my
experience and views about coping with the
transaction cost associated with this type of
involvement. I begin with a brief rcvvcw of the
political economy. This will help explain my wews
about how cconormc research and economic
education fit into the political economy. With this
backdrop, I will further develop my wews regarding
the role of economists in the policy process and
advice for those who would like for their research
to become more useful to public policy decision-
makers.
A Capsule Paradigm of the Political Economy
A kcy to a successful market and/or public
endeavor is reformation. If either the consumer or
the producer has more information than the other,
rent-seeking opporturuties will exist resulting in
potentially serious inefficiencies. As I will explain
in the next section, this type of asymmetry in
information becomes a major justification for
greater involvement of economists in the policy
process.
The development of public pohcy m a
democratic enterprise economy such as the Umted
States is heavily mfluenccd by the existing ideology
and human interachon in established institutions. In
the U.S., the prevailing ideology relies on markets
to solve many problems. Government involvement
genemlly sets the rules of trdde and/or performs
other functions that detcrrninc who will gain the
most from individud rent-seeking bchawor (SCC
Buchanan and Tollison). Individuals wear many
hats. Everyone is a consumer of both private
market goods and public scrviccs. Most adult
members of society also are producers of either
pnvatc market goods and/or public scrviccs, And
all citizens, by dcfinitlon, are participants in a
political process in which the rules of trade and
property rights are defined and redefined.
At one time, agricultural policy was
developed within an “iron triangle” of power
consisting of individuals on the IIouse and Senate
agriculture committees, those in the major Parm
orgamzations, and the administrators of farm
programs m USDA. Many different actors are now
involved. More interest groups, executive agencies,
and lcgislatlvc committees now have a stake in the
process (SCCBonnen). There is no single decision-
makcr and there is no agreed-upon set of
performance objectives. Rather there arc multiple
objectives within a process that is driven by shared
information among those within a power cluster
(Mitchell). The process N diffuse.
There are also many different arenas for
policy conflict resolution. If an agricultural interest
group has a special issue to champion, it is not
sufficient to get an authorization bill passed in
Congress. The budget and appropriation process
must be also included in their calculus of how to
allocate lobby resources. In addition, the interest
group must be equally concerned about how the
responsible executive agency will implement the
lcgnlatlon, They must also be prepared for any
judicial challenges that emerge. Finally, the media
will play a major role in public perceptions and
must not be ignored by the agricultural interest
group, For it is perceptions, not necessarily realities,
that drive decisions.
In considering a workable model for
political economy it is most important thdt one
understand the behavior of the primary participants.
In most cases, it is safe to assume that our
participants are motivated by perceived self-interest.
We have well-established theory to describe how
consumers maximize utility and producers maximize
profits. But in the political arena wc must be aware
that to elcctcd officials this means maxim~zlngvotes
and to bureaucrats maxlmixing sccurlty. Typically,
our economic models do not allow us to consider
the bchawor of elcctcd officials and bureaucrats
who always opcrdtc in an environment of inlcrcst
confhcts. Phllosophlcal idealism must bc reconciled
with stubborn politlcal and self-interest constraints.J Agr and Applied Econ Jul.v, 1994 45
Understanding this will help the economist
performing policy research.
Elected officials are rarely forthright in
revealing the performance objectives that they have
in mind for a policy. Further, since most elected
officials are faced with an impending election, the
performance they want from a policy will typically
focus on the short run -- many times at the expense
of the long run. Since elechon is critical, it is
public perceptions that matter. Therefore, to the
extent that the interested constituents believe that a
policy will have a certain desired outcome -- it will
be supported by the elected official. This was a
major message in our book Sacred Cows and }{ot
Potatoes (Browne et al.), The message to a policy
researcher is simple -- your good research may
matter very httle if it runs counter to what the
majority of constituents believe. This is a painful
statement and it points to the importance of public
policy education for the broader society, Some
beliefs can only be changed through a long-term
incremental process, There are many examples of
alternatives developed by agricultural econorrusts
that took many years to adopt. Policy changes
slowly and incrementally (Lindblom),
Bureaucrats are concerned with job
security, If your research does not contribute to job
security, it is not likely to be used by bureaucrats.
It is also rare that those administering our
agricultural policies will have thought through the
short and long run consequences of many of their
decisions. The performance objectives that they
have will be a mixture of those passed on via the
legislation and the influence of those whose well-
being depends on how implementation occurs.
Again, short-run performance dominates,
Information in A Political Svstetn
Toffler (1990) sums up the problem best
when he argues that our ability to synthesize
information is what drives modern societies.
Economists continue to develop more complex
conceptual frameworks and more powerfhl empirical
methods that have the potential to improve the
decision choices for policy-makers, Still these
methods are constrained by basic data and by the
ability of others to understand our research.
Moreover, the theoretical paradigm that has come to
prcdormnate direct hypothesis development and
testing is not universally sufficient to identify those
elements of the problem necessary to intelligently
formulate and implement a policy.
In public policy debates, information
becomes a type of propaganda tool.
Marshaling information to achieve
political agendas takes many forms. These
may mnge from anecdotal information,
which is often conveniently used to
validate society’s beliefs and biases, to
complex econometric models, which are
designed to predict the consequences of
government regulations and market
interventions, Moreover, information can
be perceived either with suspicion or
accepted as social fact without criticism.
Because developing and interpreting
information is a social process, values
mediate the usefulness and character of any
given piece of information. As such,
inforrmtion has value in all political
processes. That information is not value-
free is not a disturbing conclusion. Rather,
lmbedded in the recognition of the role of
values in msessing the politics of
information is the search for whose
interpretation will have the greatest
legitimacy. Consequently, it is in society’s
interest for some of it’s institutions to
provide a broader set of values than those
with the greatest currency in the policy
arerud. It is quite logical that policy actors
who currently have the greatest legitimacy
often peddle information that is formed to
protect and foster their interests (Skees and
Swanson, pp. 15-16).
In short, if our research is used in the
policy arena it is quite easy for it and us to become
part of someone’s political agenda--’’information
becomes a type of propaganda tool”, The norms of
society (the underlying ideology) has a large
influence on the type of information that is
developed,
As Alan Randall points out information is
not value neutral, Information that is used in the
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researcher/analyst must recognize this. What we
chose to leave out of our research rndy be just as
important as what we chose to include, These
simple realities make the academics among us very
uncomfortable. Welfare economics is grounded
with assumptions that are rooted in a value set that
gives equal value to each dollar -- regardless of who
holds that dollar in our economy. There are
economists who have lost sight of this. The debate
about positive versus normative knowledge in
economics is well-documented (see the papers from
the Socxal Science Agenda Project). It is
increasingly recognized that the fact-value or
means-ends distinction that was the hallmark of
empirical positivism will nOt Srdnd CIOSe analytical
scrutiny. Mark Blaug says it better:
any decision-maker starts with on-going
activities and begins to define his objective
m light of his expenencc with polices...
decisions-makers do not try to get what
they want; rather they learn to want by
appraising what they get. Means and ends
arc undoubtable related, and cvahiation of
past decisions or technical advice about
future decisions, searches m vain for a
(determinate) social preference function
that is not there (Blaug pp. 150-51).
Returning to the theme of rent-seeking
behavior provides a basis for understanding why
those with the most to gain from a policy change
will be willing to invest the most in providing
subsidized information in the process (see Bartlett).
Additionally, many decisions in the policy process
are made, not with scientific information, but with
anecdotal information. Interest groups arc well-
trained in using anecdotal information, Personal
testimony by citizens who are brought into
Washington by an interest group can make a
difference, Making policy based on such
information begs the question about how
generalizablc the testimony maybe or even whether
it is objectively valid,
It is easy to understand why policy-makers
default to such naive criteria when making
decisions, There are a myriad of issues that
confront them, The simple concept introduced by
Simon long ago applies more today than ever before
-- bounded rationality, The information overload
limits the ability of decision-makers as cost of
search for useful information increases. Each of us
has a limit to the amount of information we can
process, It is natural that policy-makers will default
to naive criteria or usc subsidized reformation that
is supplied by rent-seekers. All of this only
increiascsthe power of those with the most to gain
from individual policy decisions and who are
positioned to focus attention on selected bits of
information.
In theory, one would hope that economists
within the publicly supported Land Grant
Unwersitics (LGU) have little financial gain from
the type of reformation that they supply within the
policy process. To the extent that this is true,
economic research developed by LGU economists is
important in the policy process. Such research has
the potential to provide the countervailing influence
needed to balance subsidized information provided
by special interests.







The policy process is diffuse.
There arc many decision-makers
within our policy process.
Decision-makers in the policy
process place more weight on
short run performance than long
run<
Decision-makers will rare ly
disclose their performance criteria
--even if they have a well




dominates the political economy
model,
Elected officials tend to optimize
votes and bureaucrats optimize
job security.
In short, the political economy runs on
rent-seeking, job security, and vote maximization
behavior. Each of these activities are economically
inefficient. As I will argue below, economists are
among the few who will speak out for efficiency.J. Agr and Applled Econ, July, 1994 47
The Role of the Economist in the Policy Process
As a matter of simplicity I introduce the
notion that professional agricultural economists
select the world in which they will operate
abstracting from or ignoring other realities. Some
have remained “pure” and write and perform
research for academic review. They restrict their
work to professional journals and the advancement
of the discipline as defined by their peers. There
are others who have chosen to perform applied
research that can be used directly by individuals to
solve problems. They may publish in journals as
well as other more “readable” outlets, They may
also work directly with decision-makers, And there
are those who have entered the political arena where
their research may only be as valuable as the
political agenda of the policy-makers for whom they
work. Finally, there are those of us who attempt to
function in all three worlds.
Economic thinking has been heavily
influenced by the progressive movement (Nelson).
The role of the economist as a humble technocrat
still dominates many within our profession, In this
role, economists are presumed to know the
“objective function” of the government. We are
supposed to be able to identify what course of
action helps to maximize the objective function.
Such a model is obsolete. As Blaug explains:
The notion is that the economist displays
the menu of alternative possibilities, and
then the decision-maker chooses from the
menu in the light of his preference
fi.mction. The decision-maker extends
advice on both ends and means, How
indeed is that economist supposed to
discover the decision-maker’s preference
function among objectives without
imposing his own? Asking him will
usually produce a blank stare: if the
decision-maker is a politician, he is
committed first of all to maximizing
electoral support and that is best secured
by blurring objectives, not by revealing
them, Nor can the economist deduce the
politician’s preference function by studying
his past behavior: he may be inconsistent
between one declslon and another; he may
have altered his preference function over
time as a result of learning-by-doing;
besides, circumstances themselves are
changing and this itself makes inference
difficult (p, 129, Blaug).
Since decision-makers are unlikely to fully
reveal their preferences, it is not possible for the
policy researcher/analyst to perform the role of
humble technocrat. The policy researcher/analyst
must identify preferences of potential importance to
society. Helping raise the right questions is
important. Our training should make us uniquely
qualified to provide structure to real policy
problems. Part of that structure should involve
identification of performance criteria that we can
then use in the traditional policy model (Issues ->
Alternatives -> Consequences). Once we identify
relevant performance criteria, we are much more
clear in our presentation of how we evaluate
consequences -- such an evaluation requires a set of
performance criteria, Decision-makers will
determine what weights to place on the performance
criteria that we help identify.
Efficiency is a performance criterion that
economists will have on the list. It should come as
no surprise that many policy-makers discount the
importance of this goal. This is the source of much
of the disillusion suffered by economists who
attempt to work in the policy arena, Policy-makers
do not want to hear that their pet program will lead
to inefficiencies -- they are generally more
interested in transferring benefits with their
program, Nonetheless, I believe we have a
professional responsibility to point to the efficiency
implications of different alternatives. That is what
we were trained to do and there is no reason to
apologize for our training. Still, if we are to be
effective, we must recognize other performance
criteria in our research/analysisc
Over the years, I have asked those
agricultural economists who have served with the
President’s Council of Economic Advisors “How
frequently does the economic argument rule the day
in White House decisions?” The range is
somewhere between 10 and 15 percent of the time.
I then rephrase the question and ask “How
frequently does the economic argument change the
nature of the debate in White House decisions?”
The range has been between 20 and 50 percent from
my very selective sample, These are the political
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does not suggest that we should be dismayed.
There arc simply other performance criteria that
dominate efficiency,
In other words, economists can provide
information that is consistent with a list of
performance goals that wc help to illuminate. This
information will bc limited since wc do not suffer
the consequences of any final policy decisions, This
type of accountability falls on decision-makers,
Ultimately, they must decide what performance
goals count and on that basis they will determine
what is good or bad policy. For this reason, wc
should strive to make our list of performance goals
as comprehensive as possible. This will increase
that chances that we wdl provide useful structure
and information to policy decision-makers.
The Individual Re.warcher WYSLM the Pro/imlonal
Society
For those wishing to increase the usc of
their research in the policy process, there are certain
risks. The more one’s research is used, the more
likely that the researcher will bc forced into
providing quick analyses on very complex topics.
This makes most of us uncomfortable. Further, it is
easy for our colleagues to be critical of this type of
work. A certain tension will develop between those
who are more academically pure and those who are
working with policy decision-makers. I think that
this is a healthy tension that must bc channellcd into
a constructive review process.
The operative question is very simple -- N
the pohcy analyst-researcher compromising the
discipline by “quick and dirty” analysis? The
answer is one of perspective, To many academic
researchers this type of effort is distasteful. To the
busy policy analyst the critics simply don’t
understand the time pressure that require quick
delivery,
Who is responsible for professional ethics
and review of work that is performed quickly? The
policy analyst-researcher must take that
responsibility. First, he/she must be forever mindful
of how quickly the pohtics can overwhelm the best-
intended work. This means that appropriate caveats
and shortcomings of the work must be considered
and articulated. It is dangerous to oversell “quick
and dirty” analysls-research -- just as It Mdangerous
to oversell narrow economic efficiency arguments in
the political arena. Second, it is important for the
policy analyst-researcher to obtain review from
peers to minimize potential logical or empirical
shortcomings. This can be arrdngcd in any number
of ways. In my work on crop insurance I have
been fortunate to have access to a national advisory
committcc that has provided critical review of my
work. I recently attended the Food and Agricultural
Policy Research Institute’s (FAPRI) baseline review,
In this process, FAPRI organized a major
conference to critique their outlook information. I
think that this type of activity is highly constructive.
It also remains critical that LGU policy
analyst-rcscarchcr must continue to pubhsh in the
refereed journals. [t is simply not enough to write
papers and present them to professional societies.
Those of us who are working within the policy
arena have a professional responsibility to continue
to pubhsh in our journals. First, it is important that
our work be subjected to the scientific review
process. Despite the pain and the shortcomings of
our review processes, such reviews do give the
policy analyst-researcher a different perspective on
his/her work. I have found that new and useful
methods and/or approaches to problems have been
revealed during the review process. Second,
acceptance of the policy analyst-researcher’s work
in journals does carry weight with policy-makers.
They may not read or understand the journal article
work, but I have found that they respect such
publications and they reference the work when they
are using other work by the policy analyst-
researcher. Third, we have a responsibility to our
colleagues to publish our work so that they will gain
an appreciation for how applied policy research is
being used in the policy process. Additionally, if we
expect our “basic science” colleagues to develop
theoretical tools and quantitative methods that can
illuminate policy decisions, they must be confronted
by the “derived demand” that comes from knowing
the pdicy-rndking process.
There N a naivete in much of what appears
in our journals. It is common to see authors who
strive or stretch to point to the “policy relevant”
dimensions of their published work with little or no
understanding of the institutional constraints in the
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issue illustrates the point. Robison classifies over
half of the articles published in the Review of
Agricultural Econornic,s as being policy relevant.
Yet, when you examine his clwsification of readers,
it is clear that very few policy-makers read the
journal. Despite these realities, rather than become
disillusioned, or, worse, cynical, those of us doing
policy research must publish our work in the
professional journals, if for no other reason, to help
our colleagues focus on theory or methods that will
fiuther the policy analysis enterprise.
Among the most difficult challenges for a
policy researcher-analyst is holding true to the work
after it is part of the policy process. Since policy-
makers have an agenda of their own, it 1s
understandable that they seek research-analysis that
fits their biases. Further, policy-makers may extend
our work beyond its hmits. Last year 1found myself
caught in this trap. I was heavily involved in
designing a pilot test of a new crop insurance
alternative. This new product, the Group Risk Plan
(GRP), was being pilot tested in 96 counties when
the President’s budget was released m February of
1993, The budget called for replacing the
traditional Federal crop insurance product with the
GRP. I was called for Congressional testimony.
During this very awkward period, I was forced to
explain that while GRP was a reasonable altcrnatwe
for many markets, it could not be introduced in
much of the U.S. because of irmdcquate county
yield data and other limitations, Congress
ultimately mandated that GRP be expanded “to the
extent practicable” (See Skees [1993]).
When confronted with a challenge where
policy-makers are using your work beyond its valid
limits, I think we have a professional responsibility
to speak out. This is very awkward because we
want our work to be used. Still, no onc should
understand the limits of the work better than the
responsible researcher-analyst.
In short, I favor a scientific review process
as a constructive check on the policy researcher, I
believe the researcher must seek out such reviews
for his(her) own protection. However, I am also
pragmatic in understanding that all research-analysis
that enters the policy process cannot be reviewed
immediately and in appropriate depth. The utility of
good research-analysis depends on its timeliness. It
would be inappropriate for our profession to attempt
to institute a formal process such as a clearing
house before professional agricultural economists
could release their work since policy decisions will
go on with or without economic analysis, If an
agricultural economist attempts to peddle research-
analysis that is seriously flawed, I believe that
others within our profession will discover the
shortcomings rather quickly. It is our responsibility
to share the concerns with the researcher-analyst
and others who may be using the information,
There arc sufficient checks and balances in our
profession to reduce the frequency and/or the impact
of flawed research-analysis entering the process,
although the process is never riskless.
The Importance of Knowing the Institutions,
Histq-y, Actors, etc.
In order to be of the most use, our policy
research must not bc developed in a vacuum. We
must know the institutions and the history of the
policy. Much of our contribution can be enhanced
if we understand what is practical within the given
political environment. Last year, I soon learned that
pilot testing a ncw crop insurance program could
not be completed without a good knowledge of the
current crop insurance program. Issues that may
have been taken for granted, such as how to develop
the regulations for a new crop insurance program,
became potential roadblocks. I learned that
economic principles had to be emphasized as those
in charge of the regulations set about their important
work. I also learned that there were certain things
that simply could not be done. The rules and
regulation process of the U.S, government does
limit the range and flexibility of procedures used in
designing an experiment in government.
Understanding the constraints and
limitations of the bureaucratic process is extremely
important If the policy economist intends to provide
analysis that wdl be used by an implementing
agency, Agricuiturldl policy is replete with
examples of corruption and failure that can be
linked to poor forethought about implementation.
Such foresight is important as we structure our
assumptions and as we provide focus to policy
research. Further, this type of understanding can
help as we attempt to translate our findings into a
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Knowing the institutions and the actors
who will be responsible for implementation will
help since much of the policy activity does occur
outside the legislative process. Potentially good
policies can quickly become bad ones due to inept
regulatory decrees or poor implementation,
Implementation plays a major role in agricultural
and food policies, Implementing agencies need
policy research as much or more than legislators,
In many cases, implementing agencies will fund
research. But if the research is to fulfill its
fimction, it must comprehend the problem matrix of
the implementing agency and its support base.
Simplicity is Needed
Among the most important aspects of
useful policy research-analysls is simplicity, We are
not trained to meet this challenge. Our methods are
becoming increasingly complex, Many times the
methods far surpass the quality of our data, And
many of our methods are typically too complex to
be understood by policy-makers. For the would-be
policy economists learning to evaluate the marginal
value product of more complex methods is essential.
We must be willing to compromise on methods to
get results,
In recent years, I have tried to impress this
point on my graduate students. They resist because
the journals reward complexity of methods, I have
tried to structure problems so that they can evaluate
the value of information from more complex
methods versus more simple methods. If simple
provides nearly as much value -- simple is better
because it is more easily communicated,
comprehended, and interpreted, I believe a large
part of the art of a successful economist who
decides to wander from campus is an ability and
willingness 10use more direct methods to reach the
same conclusions. This does not mean that your
work cannot be backstopped with more complex
methods that could appear in the journals, It does
mean you must make compromises and that you
must be willing to accept ridicule from those who
think your research is too simple.
A major part of simplicity IS good
communication skills with an ability to
communicate the substance of a complex idea in
understandable terms. Effective presentations to
groups that have a stake in the policy outcome will
enhance the usefulness of policy research. This will
help them understand the work and also provide
feedback about their concerns and needed
improvements in the work, Writing for outlets
beyond the journals is also essential,
The Need to Anticipate Emerging Issues
Policy research-analysis requires timely
input. This means that the would-be policy
economist must learn to anticipate emergmg issues.
Becoming an expert in an emerging area requires
focus and dedication, However, if your instincts are
right and the area that you decide to focus in
becomes “hot”, the dividends can be high both in
terms of policy outcome and professional reputation.
In order to anticipate issues, it is important
to develop a network of other policy researchers,
This may mean going outside of the discipline of
economics and it should mean some contact with
those who are closest to the policy process,
Researchers within the LGUS have a good deal of
flexibility to work on issues they consider
important. Developing one or two focus areas that
you think will be importmt is a first step to making
yourself valuable to policy-makers. Once a topic
becomes “hot” it is too late to develop a research
agenda. Those who have a record of research will
not only be in demand, but more importantly, they
can bring a considerable latitude injudgement to the
process. In short, without some previous research,
it would be impossible to answer the types of
questions asked by policy-makers. Further, if you
cannot provide rather quick responses to policy-
makers, your input is of little value. Anticipating
issues will help you capitalize on the teachable
moment.
Conclusions
Policy research is being used in the policy
process. Still the profession can contribute more in
this arena, However, it requires that the policy
researcher/analyst be willing to accept the fact that
most people do not think like an economist,
Performance other than efficiency dominate political
decisions. This imposes a large transaction cost for
those agricultural economists who want their
researchlanalysis to be used in the policy arena,J Agr, and Applied Econ., July, 1994
Coping with the political economy requires that the
analyst/researcher develop a workable pamdigmof
the political economy, Such a paradigm also affords
the analysthesearcher more insights into conducting
policy relevant research since it can identify the
broader array of elements that are germane to
informed decision-making.
In this paper, I have dismissed the humble
technocrat model for agricultural economists, This
dismissal was based on three factors: 1) It is
difficult to get to know the performance criteria of
decision-makers; 2) We can contribute to the
process by helping illuminate important performance
goals; and 3) Economists are very likely the only
constituents for efficiency. Once we recognize that
other performance goals are important, we can more
effectively use the
Issues -> Alternatives -> Consequences
framework whereby we include efficiency as part of
a larger set of performance goals in our evalwdtion.
Those in the decision process will determine how
much weight efficiency will receive.
As economist we are too quick to develop
well structured models that use a limited model
based on only economic efficiency. The major
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shortcoming is that what we believe may be a good
policy alternative simply cannot be implemented or,
worse, if an attempt to implement the concept is
made, there are serious unintended and
unmticipated consequences. Knowing the
institutions and the history within our political
economy model may improve our ability to model
and develop policy alternatives that are more in tune
with the political realties.
In short, the would-be policy
researcherhamdlystmust be willing to cope and adapt
within a political economy where efficiency is not
an important performance goal, Quite possibly the
biggest risk associated with an economist becoming
more involved in the policy making process is that
he/she may become cynical. This is a major reason
that one must strive to understand why the system
works the way it does. I remember one particularly
bleak evening in my Washington experience. As I
walked across the Key bridge, I wondered if I
would ever feel the naive enthusiasm about the
Washington environment again. Although I have
reflected on that evening numerous times over the
years, I have not yet become cynical. I remain a bit
awed that the process works as well as it does. I
have also learned that the information that
economists bring to that process can improve the
process and thdt is enough to warrant a rather large
analytical input.
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